Ruthy Trenche: guilty of the deaths, but not for being drunk

Karaya Boricua · Editorial Analysis

Ruthy Trenche: guilty of the deaths, but not for being drunk

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A blood alcohol test of 0.15 percent. Two horseback riders struck from behind while riding in the same direction as the vehicle. And a verdict that, at first read, seems to contradict itself: guilty of causing two deaths, but not guilty of causing them through intoxication. The answer isn't in the headline. It's in how the law separates seven distinct charges that almost no one reads one by one.

Before examining the legal mechanism, it helps to examine the record. Ruthy Trenche Chávez was not just any driver. Her name was tied to a driving school, a fact that doesn't make her more culpable, but that adds a contrast hard to ignore in a case that ended, on August 5, 2026, in a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol and for causing, through negligent driving, the death of two people.

The facts

On the night of March 23, 2024, Trenche Chávez was driving a 2019 Toyota Tundra along highway PR-188, in Loíza, near kilometer 3.9. It was approximately 11:35 p.m. Also in the area were José Jaime Díaz Serrano and Eduardo Eugenio Álvarez Sosa, both 43, who were riding their horses along the road's shoulder, traveling in the same direction as the vehicle.

As reported by Metro Puerto Rico after the verdict, the evidence presented at trial established that Trenche Chávez veered onto the shoulder and struck the two men and their horses with the front of her vehicle. Díaz Serrano died at the scene. Álvarez Sosa was severely injured and died days later while receiving medical treatment.

Police officers administered a breath test to Trenche Chávez at the scene. The result was 0.15 percent blood alcohol content, nearly double the legal limit of 0.08 percent.

The judicial process

The Department of Justice filed seven charges against Trenche Chávez on June 28, 2024: five under Articles 5.07(c), 7.02 and 7.06(c) of Puerto Rico's Vehicle and Traffic Law, and two under the Animal Welfare and Protection Act, for the deaths of the two horses. The trial began in January 2025 before Judge Edgar S. Figueroa Vázquez, of the Carolina Court of First Instance, and ran for more than a year.

The defense, led by attorney Edwin Castro, signaled its theory of the case from the arraignment. As reported by Telemundo Puerto Rico in December 2024, Castro said he would establish that the negligence in the accident belonged to the victims, not to his client. During the trial, the defense challenged the point of impact, the direction in which the riders were traveling, and the methodology police used to calculate the vehicle's speed. As reported by Wapa TV, the attorney also alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of the expert witness and that of the investigating officer.

The prosecution, for its part, presented the alcohol test, an accident reconstruction expert's analysis, and the testimony of investigating officer Alexander H. Gaztambide Franco, who placed the driver traveling along the road's shoulder. Prosecutor Juan M. Mencacci Bagú summarized the State's theory in a line reported by Telemundo Puerto Rico: that in criminal law there is no such thing as comparative negligence, and that responsibility rested with a single person.

Editorial note: the exact identity of the reconstruction expert and which side called him, the prosecution or the defense, is still pending confirmation before this publication.

Seven charges, seven decisions

The most common mistake in reading this case is treating it as a single accusation of killing two riders. In reality, each charge required the prosecution to prove distinct elements, and the judge evaluated each one separately.

ChargeWhat the prosecution had to proveVerdictArt. 5.07(c) — death of José J. Díaz SerranoReckless or negligent driving that caused the deathGuiltyArt. 5.07(c) — death of Eduardo E. Álvarez SosaReckless or negligent driving that caused the deathGuiltyArt. 7.02 — driving under the influence of alcoholBlood alcohol concentration at or above the legal limitGuiltyArt. 7.06(c), Law 22 — Díaz Serrano's death as a result of intoxicationThat the death was the specific result of driving drunkNot guiltyArt. 7.06(c), Law 22 — Álvarez Sosa's death as a result of intoxicationThat the death was the specific result of driving drunkNot guilty

Why it isn't a contradiction

Article 5.07(c) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law punishes anyone who, through reckless or negligent driving, causes the death of another person. It doesn't require intent to kill. The judge, in finding her guilty under this provision, determined that Trenche Chávez drove negligently and that this negligence caused both deaths.

Article 7.02 operates independently: it prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the legal limit, regardless of whether an accident occurs. That charge also resulted in a conviction.

Article 7.06(c) of Law 22 of 2000 is different. It isn't enough to prove that the person was driving drunk and caused a fatal accident. The law requires an additional causal link: that the death occurred specifically as a consequence of driving under the influence of alcohol. That is the aggravating element, and it is what separated the three convictions from the two acquittals.

The judge accepted that Trenche Chávez was driving drunk, that she drove negligently, and that this negligence caused both deaths. What was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, according to the theory the defense planted around the accident reconstruction, was that the state of intoxication itself, rather than some other form of negligence, was the specific cause of the deaths.

What we still don't know

As of this publication, the court has not made public a written opinion detailing exactly what the reasonable doubt under Article 7.06(c) rested on. Without that document, it cannot be said with certainty whether the decisive factor was the challenge to the reconstruction of the point of impact, the calculated speed, the riders' position, or the difficulty of directly linking the intoxication to the cause of the crash.

The sentencing date, as well as the exact penalty Trenche Chávez faces under the charges on which she was found guilty, are pending confirmation from a primary source before being included in this space.

EDITORIAL QUESTION

Should Puerto Rico law require such a specific causal link between intoxication and death to impose the aggravated offense, or is that standard exactly what keeps the mere fact of having been drinking from substituting for the rigorous proof due process demands?

Primary sources and court coverage

—Metro Puerto Rico, verdict coverage, August 5, 2026
—NotiCel, verdict coverage, August 5, 2026
—Telemundo Puerto Rico, verdict coverage, August 5, 2026
—Telemundo Puerto Rico, defense statements, December 19, 2024
—El Nuevo Día, court coverage, December 19, 2024 and January 9, 2025
—Primera Hora, court coverage, December 19, 2024
—Wapa TV, Lo Sé Todo, trial coverage
—Puerto Rico Department of Justice, charging statement, June 28, 2024

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